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Updating beliefs beyond the here-and-now:
the counter-factual self in anosognosia
for hemiplegia
Louise P. Kirsch,1,2 Christoph Mathys,3,4,5 Christina Papadaki,2 Penelope Talelli,6
Karl Friston,7 Valentina Moro8 and Aikaterini Fotopoulou2
The syndrome of anosognosia for hemiplegia, or the lack of awareness for one’s paralysis following right hemisphere stroke,
can provide unique insights into the neurocognitive mechanisms of self-awareness. Yet it remains unclear whether anosognosia
for hemiplegia is a modality-specific deficit of sensorimotor monitoring, or whether domain-general processes of attention and
belief-updating converge to cause anosognosia for hemiplegia. Using a Bayesian learning framework, we formalized and empirical-
ly investigated the hypothesis that failures to update anosognosic beliefs can be explained by abnormalities in the relative
uncertainty (i.e. precision) ascribed to prior beliefs versus sensory information in different contexts. We designed a new motor be-
lief-updating task that manipulated both the temporal (prospective and retrospective) and spatial (hemispace most affected by in-
attention and hemispace less affected by inattention) conditions in which beliefs had to be updated, and we validated its sensitivity
to anosognosia for hemiplegia in 26 patients with right hemisphere stroke. We then computed and empirically tested two different
Bayesian predictors of prospective beliefs using two proxies for precision in anosognosia for hemiplegia patients: (i) standardized,
neuropsychological measures of objective attention abilities, i.e. visuospatial neglect scores and (ii) subjective uncertainty reports,
i.e. confidence ratings. Our results suggest that while neglect does not affect local, sensorimotor error monitoring, it does seem to
affect the degree to which observed errors are used to update more general, prospective beliefs about counterfactual motor abilities
in anosognosia for hemiplegia. Difficulties in such ‘counterfactual’ belief-updating were associated with disruptions in tracts of the
ventral attentional network (i.e. superior longitudinal fasciculus connecting the temporo-parietal junction and ventral frontal
cortex) and associated lesions to the insula, inferior parietal cortex and superior temporal regions. These results suggest that self-
awareness extends beyond local, retrospective monitoring, requiring also salience-based, convergence of beliefs about the self that
go beyond the ‘here-and-now’ of sensorimotor experience.
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Pyramide Building, Institut des Systèmes Intelligents et de Robotique (ISIR), Sorbonne Université, 4 Place Jussieu,
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Introduction
In order to navigate a changing world, people have to
update their current beliefs in the face of new evidence.
This belief-updating may be facilitated by the monitoring
and evaluation of experience, as when one notices one’s
mistakes without any feedback. This ability is typically
referred to as metacognition.1,2 People may have different
degrees of confidence (subjective uncertainty) about the
accuracy of their perceptions or memories—and a large
body of scientific evidence is dedicated to such ‘retro-
spective’ aspects of metacognition.3 People may also vary
in how they metacognitively evaluate their abilities in the
future. For example, people may be overconfident in their
ability to learn new skills. This ‘prospective’ metacogni-
tion has been shown to dissociate from retrospective
metacognition.3 Finally, people may also have different
evidence gathering strategies regarding their beliefs, pri-
oritizing certain pieces of evidence over others; for ex-
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negative information.4,5 Such differences in belief-updat-
ing and metacognition have been of great interest across
many fields, spanning from social sciences to neuroscience
and psychiatry, with several debates such as the relation
between the above kinds of metacognition, the Bayesian-
optimality of such processes6 and their domain-general or
modality-specific nature.7 Although metacognitive beliefs
are an important part of the construct of metacognition,
we can note that the terminology encompasses other
processes as well (e.g. there are ongoing debates about
the precise relation between metamemory and mentalisa-
tion to perceptual metacognition).
A unique way to inform such debates is to systematic-
ally study deficits in belief-updating in neurological
patients. One such neuropsychological symptom is ano-
sognosia for hemiplegia (AHP), defined as the apparent
unawareness of one’s paralysis,8 which occurs typically
following stroke-induced right perisylvian lesions.9 It is
axiomatic to AHP that patients fail to update their beliefs
regarding their motor abilities even when confronted with
their severe, contralesional motor loss during neurological
examination.10,11 Moreover, patients do not update their
anosognosic beliefs even against the evidence of their
massively compromised daily living abilities, more fre-
quent falls than other stroke patients12 and ample medic-
al and social feedback.13 In that sense, their beliefs are
considered as delusional. Despite advances in the under-
standing of AHP,14 at least two fundamental questions
remain regarding the inability of these patients to update
their delusional beliefs about themselves.
First, it is debated whether AHP can be explained as a
secondary consequence of concomitant sensory or cogni-
tive deficits, or whether it is a specific disorder of forward,
motor monitoring. According to the former, patients with
AHP are unable to update their beliefs regarding their
motor abilities because they no longer have good enough
access to contrary ‘feedback’ about their paralysis. For ex-
ample, patients may be unable to notice their errors and
update their beliefs due to their contralesional neglect.15
By contrast, according to action monitoring theories,16,17
patients with AHP have a specific deficit in monitoring the
discrepancy between predicted and actual sensory feedback
due to lesions to the lateral premotor cortex.18,19 In sup-
port of this theory, we have experimentally observed that
patients experience an illusory sense of moving their para-
lyzed arm only when planning to move themselves and
not when they are anticipating passive movement of the
same arm, planned by someone else.20
Second, it is unclear whether patients’ inability to up-
date their anosognosic beliefs is modality-specific (local
monitoring deficits), or whether domain-general processes
of belief-updating and metacognition are also necessary
to account for AHP (global monitoring deficits).21–24
Patients with AHP have reality monitoring deficits, confus-
ing for example merely imagined with actually executed
actions25,26 and belief-updating deficits, being for instance
overconfident and inflexible in a verbal information-gath-
ering.27 Finally, anosognosic errors are associated with
disruptions of allocentric mentalisation related to inferior
parietal lobule lesions,13 suggesting that patients’ self-
awareness is not facilitated by the ability to ‘see’ them-
selves as others regard them, similarly to findings in other
neuropathologies and psychopathologies.28–31
Taken together, accumulated evidence suggests that
anosognosic beliefs for hemiplegia (HP) can be explained
by both impaired local sensorimotor monitoring and
impairments in more global, metacognitive monitoring.
Such multicomponent understandings of anosognosic
behaviours in general can be found also in other fields
such as in dementia research.28 However, previous multi-
factorial models of AHP have considered the relation be-
tween such factors as merely cumulative, with damage to
at least two independent modules considered necessary
for AHP to occur.21,23,32 Using a unifying theoretical
framework (the Bayesian Brain hypothesis),33,34 we have
proposed instead that AHP can be explained as a discon-
nection between several of the normally convergent sen-
sorimotor, metacognitive and mentalisation functions that
support self-awareness,23,24,35 as explained below.
According to this framework, the brain uses its prior
learning to construct generative models about the embod-
ied self that encode predictions not only about the hidden
causes of current, noisy sensory inputs, but also about
the inferred causes of ‘counterfactual’ sensory inputs. The
latter depend on predicted but not-as-yet executed actions
(e.g. what will it feel like when I grab that cup of hot
coffee), potential spatial positions one may occupy (e.g.
how would I grab that cup of coffee if I were sitting at
the other side of the table), emotional and social condi-
tions one may encounter (e.g. how embarrassed would I
be if my friend saw me drop that coffee cup).24,36 In that
sense, self-awareness involves inferential processes with
counterfactual depth.24,37 Accordingly, the inability of
patients to update their anosognosic beliefs may be
understood as the inability to draw new inferences not
only about their motor abilities in the here-and-now of
experience (e.g. did I just move as I intended to?), but
also about counterfactual, prospective motor abilities (e.g.
could I do this same action tomorrow, or at home?). To
our knowledge, however, this kind of prospective aware-
ness has not been yet examined in AHP.
Furthermore, according to this Bayesian brain hypothesis
framework, belief-updating is dependent upon the relative
uncertainty (or, mathematically its inverse precision)38,39
ascribed to prior beliefs relative to sensory information,
which determines how prediction errors are weighted in
the formation of posterior beliefs. In computational psych-
iatry, precision abnormalities have provided an explanation
for psychopathological symptoms, including delusions.40–42
Accordingly, using a Bayesian learning framework,43,44 we
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formalized and empirically investigated the hypothesis that
failures to update anosognosic beliefs about counterfactual
motor abilities will be explained by abnormalities in the
precision ascribed to prior beliefs relative to sensory infor-
mation.24 Owing to the clinical restrictions of studying
acute stroke patients, one cannot design a belief-updating
task with sufficient trials to allow formal learning model-
ling as in many other psychopathologies. However, one
can sample explicit beliefs under carefully controlled ex-
perimental conditions and use key neuropsychological
measures as ‘proxies for precision’ to test alternative
Bayesian models of belief-updating.
To this aim, we designed a new motor belief-updating
task that manipulated both the temporal (prospective and
retrospective) and spatial (affected versus unaffected hemi-
space) conditions in which beliefs had to be updated. The
task allowed us to measure how prospective estimates about
bimanual motor abilities are updated on the basis of retro-
spective estimates about corresponding action attempts in
the contralesional (most affected by neglect) and in the ipsi-
lesional (less affected by neglect) hemispace. The task also
allowed us to compute and empirically test two different
Bayesian predictors of prospective beliefs using two proxies
for precision: (i) Objective standardized, neuropsychological
measures of attention, i.e. visuospatial neglect scores and (ii)
Subjective uncertainty reports, i.e. confidence ratings. We
explain below the background and precise hypotheses that
motivated these measures and manipulations.
Although patients with AHP typically also suffer from
hemispatial neglect, neglect is not considered a necessary,
nor sufficient deficit for AHP, given the long-observed
double-dissociations between the two symptoms.45
However, such dissociations do not exclude the possibil-
ity that visuospatial neglect contributes to AHP in func-
tional convergence with other deficits.22,23 In the
framework used here, this functional convergence can be
understood as related to precision. Specifically, in predict-
ive coding, the precision afforded by various beliefs—or
sensory evidence—can be taken as the computational
homologue of attention.46,47 For example, attending to a
particular source of information corresponds to increasing
the precision of the associated (sensory) prediction errors.
Thus, a formal account of visuospatial neglect—in terms
of aberrant precision may—be particularly apt for
explaining its contribution to anosognosia, as it has been
in a related phenomenology of altered motor awareness,
namely functional motor disorders.48 In such pathologies,
precision optimization is regarded as a domain-general
ability depending broadly on the functional convergence
of various neuromodulatory functions.49 Yet in the case
of AHP, the observed lesions and structural disconnec-
tions of the ventral attentional system,13,50 which have
been linked with difficulties in reorienting attention in
contralesional hemispace based on salience and behav-
ioural relevance,51,52 may play a similar role, particularly
when there are concomitant lesions to the basal ganglia
and the limbic system.50,53,54
Accordingly, using a spatial manipulation and standar-
dized measurements of each patient’s attentional deficits
(as proxies for precision), we could generate an approxi-
mate measure of each patient’s ability to attend to predic-
tion errors in the affected, contralesional versus the
unaffected, ipsilesional hemispace. We hypothesized that
AHP patients would have greater difficulties in monitor-
ing their errors retrospectively and updating their beliefs
prospectively in the affected than the unaffected hemi-
space, where their inattention would render prediction
errors imprecise and would thus influence the relative
precision of prior beliefs and sensory prediction errors.
Moreover, as neglect is not a sufficient explanation for
AHP, we reasoned that measurements of subjective uncer-
tainty3 could offer additional insights regarding the confi-
dence with which patients hold their prior versus their
retrospective, posterior beliefs. In at least some patients,
other deficits could introduce biases in subjective uncer-
tainty about beliefs,27 which in turn could cause perform-
ance monitoring errors as observed in other
pathologies.55 Thus, we used confidence ratings as a se-
cond ‘subjective’ proxy for precision and tested whether
neglect-based or, confidence-based Bayesian belief-updat-
ing models, including objective (neglect scores) versus
subjective (confidence scores) proxies for precision, re-
spectively, would best capture anosognosic beliefs in the
different temporal and spatial conditions tested here.
Finally, we conducted voxel-based, lesion-symptom map-
ping analyses to identify the lesions and white matter dis-
connections associated with (i) clinical anosognosia; (ii)
prior beliefs about motor ability across hemispaces; and (iii)
posterior prospective beliefs in the contralesional hemispace,
where we expected belief-updating difficulties. Consistently
with the above disconnection hypotheses23,24 and based on
previous work,53,56,57 including a recent study50 with an
advanced lesion analyses methods and the largest sample to
date (N¼ 174), we predicted that difficulties in updating
prospective beliefs, particularly in the contralesional hemi-
space, will be associated with disruptions in tracts and
structures belonging to at least two systems: namely the lim-
bic system and the ventral attentional network [i.e. superior
longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) connections between temporo-
parietal junction and ventral frontal cortex, including in this
case, possible direct lesions to the insula].
Materials and methods
Participants
Twenty-six, unilateral, right-hemisphere-lesioned stroke
patients (mean age: 64.58 6 14.26 years; 14 females) were
recruited from consecutive admissions to seven stroke
wards in London as part of a large study on body
awareness after right hemisphere stroke using the follow-
ing inclusion criteria: (i) imaging-confirmed first ever right
hemisphere lesion; (ii) contralateral HP; (iii) <4 months
from onset; (iv) no previous history of neurological or
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psychiatric illness; (v) >7 years of education; (vi) no medi-
cation with significant cognitive or mood side-effects; (vii)
no language impairments that precluded completion of the
study assessments; and (viii) right handed.
Patients were divided into two groups based on the
presence (AHP group, N¼ 11) or absence (HP group,
N¼ 15) of anosognosia for HP, diagnosed as in previous
studies13,56 based on the Berti interview10 and validated
using the Feinberg scale58 (see Supplementary materials,
Methods 1, for full details).
All participants gave written, informed consent to par-
ticipate in the study. The local National Health System
Ethics Committees approved the study, which was carried
out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Neuropsychological and neurological
assessment
All patients underwent neurological and neuropsycho-
logical assessment, presented in Table 1. The two groups
did not show significant differences in neuropsychological
testing, other than in awareness measures, as expected.
The target group showed a trend towards performing
worse on the line bisection test. Beyond group differen-
ces, individual differences in neglect will be considered in
subsequent analyses given our main spatial manipulation
(see section below Bayesian Posterior Beliefs).
Motor belief-updating task
Design and main predictions
To quantify how anosognosic patients update their beliefs
about motor abilities, we developed a new ‘Motor Belief-
updating’ task (see Fig. 1). Participants were asked to
estimate prospectively their motor ability to perform
everyday bimanual actions, before attempts to execute
such actions. After attempting the actions, patients had to
then provide retrospective estimates of performance.
Finally, they were asked again to estimate the corre-
sponding motor ability prospectively. Thus, there were
three estimates for each action, a prior prospective esti-
mate, a retrospective estimate and a posterior prospective
estimate. For each estimate, patients also provided a con-
fidence rating, stating how confident they were in the ac-
curacy of their estimate. Importantly, to manipulate the
level of attention available to action monitoring, the
requisite objects were presented in two different periper-
sonal spatial positions; namely, in the patient’s contrale-
sional and ipsilesional hemispace, and patients had to
attempt to perform the actions within these two hemispa-
ces. This allowed us to first examine whether the two
groups (patients with AHP and patients with HP) differed
in their prior prospective beliefs about their ability to
execute bimanual actions across the hemispaces (i.e. irre-
spective of neglect). Given their anosognosia, we expected
the AHP group to show significantly higher scores than
the HP group in both hemispaces, even though both
groups were unable to perform any of the actions (due
to their HP). This result would validate our task as a
sensitive task for anosognosia. Correlations of prior and
posterior prospective estimates with clinical AHP scores
in both groups would add further validity to our task as
capturing symptom-specific, belief-updating in patients
with AHP.
We expected the AHP group to show greater difference
between prior prospective and retrospective estimates, as
well as between the latter and posterior prospective esti-
mates, in the ipsilesional than in the contralesional field,
Table 1 Patient groups’ demographic and neuropsychological profiles
AHP (n 5 11) HP (n 5 15) Mann–Whitney test
Mean SD Mean SD Z df P
Age (years) 66.82 13.600 61.87 15.226 0.911 26 0.376
MRC Left upper limb (max 5) 0.09 0.302 0.08 0.289 0.063 23 1.000
Berti motor awareness scale 2.364 0.9511 0.267 0.7761 3.731 26 <0.001
Feinberg awareness scale 5.727 3.2432 1.208c 1.3392 3.710 23 <0.001
Digit span forwards 6.45 1.368 6.23b 1.589 0.446 24 0.665
Digit span backwards 3.73 1.421 3.92b 2.326 0.474 24 0.656
MOCA memory (max 5) 1.75e 2.062 2.50e 1.773 0.529 12 0.673
MOCA total (max 30) 17.35e 3.70 21.25e 5.59 1.615 13 0.116
Personal bias (Comb/Razor bias) 20.43a 27.89 26.92b 36.74 0.807 23 0.445
Line cancellation bias 49.21 49.18 34.85f 43.21 0.169 19 0.885
Bisiach one item test (max 3) .38c 0.518 .22e 0.667 1.039 17 0.506
Line bisection (max 9) 3.56a 2.242 5.92b 3.068 1.990 22 0.048
HADS depression 7.00d 2.449 4.80g 3.271 0.990 12 0.364
HADS anxiety 6.57d 1.988 7.20g 2.864 0.423 12 0.711
Values calculated with missing data: a ¼ group n-1; b ¼ group n-2; c ¼ group n-3; d¼ group n-4; e ¼ group n-6; f ¼ group n-7; g ¼ group n-10. The Medical Research Council scale
(MRC; Guarantors of Brain, 1986) was used to assess motor strength. The Berti motor awareness scale10 and the Feinberg awareness58 were used to assess anosognosia for hemi-
plegia symptoms. General cognitive functioning and long-term verbal recall were assessed using the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA)59 and working memory assessed using
the digit span task from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III.60 Visuospatial neglect were assessed using subscales of the Behavioural Inattention Test61 (line cancellation and line
bisection) and personal neglect was assessed by the ‘One Item’ test,62 and ‘Comb/Razor’ test.63 The Hospital Depression and Anxiety Scale (HADS)64 was used to assess anxiety
and depression. The scores of both patient groups were within the normal range on the HADS (range: 0–7 normal, 8–10 borderline, 11þ).
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suggesting that neglect influenced the degree they
attended to their motor errors in the affected hemispace
retrospectively and prospectively. Given the consecutive
nature of the task, and individual variability in both neg-
lect and subjective beliefs, to investigate how patients
with AHP take into account the relative precision be-
tween their prior beliefs and their retrospective estimates
when aiming to update their prospective beliefs, we for-
malized posterior prospective belief updating according to
a Bayesian learning framework (see section Bayesian
Posterior Beliefs below). This formalization allowed us to
built alternative models of Bayesian prospective beliefs
taking into account in each hemispace, each patient’s
prior prospective belief (prior prospective estimates), evi-
dence (retrospective estimates), and uncertainty (with two
precision proxies: confidence as a subjective proxy vs.
neglect as an objective proxy). We then compared these
models against patients’ actual posterior estimates, under
the hypothesis that the neglect-based model would cap-
ture posterior prospective beliefs better in the contrale-
sional hemispace, whereas the confidence-based model
would best explain ipsilesional hemispace beliefs.
Procedure and measures
To control for perceptual set and affordance, an object
corresponding to a bimanual everyday action (e.g. using
cutlery) was positioned on a table in front of the partici-
pants, on their midline, and they were asked to rate the
importance of this action in their everyday life (e.g. ‘How
important is it for you to be able to cut your steak using
both hands?’ – note that no statistically significant differ-
ences were found between the groups, see Supplementary
Results 1 for details). During the main task, participants
were then presented with one of the objects (i.e. cutlery,
or gloves, or shirt), positioned on the table in front
of their torso, on pre-established distances (30 cm, either
to the right or, to the left of the midline), corresponding
to contralesional and ipsilesional hemispaces, as shown
in Fig. 1.
Participants were then asked to give their motor
performance estimates using an 11-point Likert-type
‘Performance scale’, vertically presented to avoid any con-
found with neglect, ranging from 0 ¼ ‘Not at all’ to
10 ¼ ‘Extremely well’. For every estimate, they were also
asked to rate their confidence in the accuracy of their es-
timate using a six-point Likert-type, vertical ‘Confidence
scale’ (0 ¼ ‘Not at all confident’ to 5 ¼ ‘Extremely confi-
dent’ – results for confidence ratings are presented in
Supplementary Results 2 and Supplementary Fig. 1).
For each hemispace, one object was selected and
patients were first asked for baseline Prior Prospective
performance estimates and corresponding confidence rat-
ings, as above (e.g. ‘Please give me your estimate about
how well, in your current state, you would be able to
put these gloves on both hands’).
The patient was subsequently asked to perform the ac-
tion (e.g. put on a pair of gloves, hold a fork and knife,
and pretend to cut a steak, button-up a shirt with both
hands). They had a maximum of one minute to perform
the action and could stop at any time. They were subse-
quently asked to rate their performance (Retrospective
performance estimate, e.g. ‘How well have you done it?’),
and to estimate their confidence, as above. Lastly,
subsequently without any break, the experimenter asked
participants to give a further, Posterior Prospective per-
formance estimate, and a corresponding confidence rating
(see Fig. 1; e.g. ‘Now that you’ve tried this, can you
please give me your estimate again about how well, in
your current state, you would be able to put these gloves
on both hands’). Following a break of minimum 20–
30 min, to avoid carry-over effect and allow some rest,
the procedure was then repeated with a new item in the
other hemispace (out of three, put on gloves, cut food
with cutlery and button a shirt with both hands, random-
ized between participants and hemispaces, as much as
possible due to the odd numbers). The order of the two
blocks was counterbalanced between the participants in
each group.
Bayesian Posterior Beliefs
Posterior Prospective Performance estimates can be influ-
enced by different types of uncertainty or precision which
can influence the way patients weight the new incoming
information (i.e. their perception of failure to perform the
bimanual action, given by their retrospective performance
estimate). Two Bayesian Posterior Beliefs were computed
for each patient with AHP on each hemispace, with two
indexes of uncertainty, in turn (i) patients’ confidence rat-
ings on their performance estimates as a subjective proxy















Figure 1 Motor belief-updating task. Timeline of one typical
trial. Each patient performed the task once in each hemispace
(contralesional and ipsilesional). Patients estimated their
performance and confidence at three different time points: before
attempting to execute the action (prior prospective estimates); just
after the execution attempt (retrospective estimates); and a third
time as posterior prospective estimates. Two different Bayesian
update scores were computed from the patient’s ratings (see details
in the Methods 2.4).
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for precision and (ii) patients’ neglect scores as an object-
ive proxy for precision:
i. The confidence-weighted Bayesian posterior belief about
motor ability was computed as a measure considering both
prior prospective and retrospective performance estimates
as well as confidence ratings to calculate an updated
Bayesian prospective motor belief. This measure was gener-
ated using the generic Bayesian update equation for beliefs
in response to new information under a Gaussian model
with conjugate prior.43,44 This measure allows us to assess
how confidence-weighted, prior prospective motor beliefs
are updated based on retrospective beliefs about one’s ac-
tion attempt. Specifically, the confidence-weighted Bayesian
posterior belief lhjyp was computed as follows:




where lh ¼ prior prospective motor performance esti-
mate; y ¼ retrospective motor performance estimate; pe
¼ retrospective confidence estimate, and phjy ¼ pe þ ph,
with ph¼ prior prospective confidence estimate.
i. The neglect-weighted Bayesian posterior belief about
motor ability was computed as a measure considering both
prior prospective and retrospective performance estimates as
well as individual external precision, as measured by
patients’ neglect scores. Specifically, the neglect-weighted
Bayesian posterior belief lhjynwas computed as follows:
lhjyn ¼ lh þ
1
1þ mðneglectscoreÞ y lhÞð
where lh ¼ prior prospective motor performance esti-
mate; y ¼ retrospective motor performance estimate; and
ðneglectscoreÞ is the rescaled composite neglect score.
This neglect score was computed by first rescaling separ-
ately the scores of the line cancellation and line bisection
tests (subparts of the Behavioural Inattention Test)61 in
order to have 0¼ no bias and 100¼maximal bias, and
then by averaging these two scores for each patient.
Finally, comparing these Bayesian posterior beliefs
lhjypand lhjyn to the actual posterior prospective perform-
ance estimate given by AHP patients allows the measure-
ment of whether patients estimated their performance in
a Bayesian way given their prior prospective belief (prior
prospective estimates), evidence (retrospective estimates)
and uncertainty (precision proxies: confidence vs. neglect).
These Bayesian posterior belief model errors (confidence-
weighted and neglect-weighted, respectively) were inde-
pendently computed in each hemispace, by subtracting
each Bayesian posterior belief to the actual posterior pro-
spective performance estimate patients gave.
Behavioural statistical analyses
First, we assessed whether our task could capture the un-
awareness of motor disabilities in the AHP group. To do
so, we compared prior prospective performance estimates
in both AHP and HP groups. As these estimates were
not normally distributed in the HP group, the effect of
group was analysed using a non-parametric Mann–
Whitney test; hemispace effects were analysed using a
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test; and the interaction of group
and hemispace was analysed by calculating the difference
between the estimates on the ipsilesional and the con-
tralesional hemispace, using non-parametric Mann–
Whitney tests to ask whether the group had a significant
effect on this difference.
Given that the HP control groups’ prior belief scores
were very low across hemispaces (ceiling effects) and
hence they had little meaningful margins for belief-updat-
ing, we focussed our analyses on potential hemispace dif-
ferences in the AHP group. For completeness, we
conducted the corresponding, analyses with both groups
and observed similar patterns of results (Supplementary
Fig. 2 and Supplementary Results Section 3).
To examine hemispace differences in retrospective esti-
mates, we compared prior prospective performance esti-
mates to retrospective performance estimates in the AHP
group, depending on the hemispace the action was per-
formed. A 2  2 repeated-measures ANOVA was con-
ducted as the residuals were approximately normally
distributed. Similarly, we assessed prospective estimates,
by comparing retrospective performance estimates to pos-
terior perspective performance estimates, in the AHP
group, depending on hemispace. Bonferroni corrections
were used to correct for multiple comparisons in post-
hoc tests. All reported values are two-tailed.
Finally, to investigate prospective belief updating fol-
lowing action, Bayesian posterior belief model errors
were analysed in the AHP group, separately for each
hemispace with one-sample t-tests to assess for any sig-
nificant deviation of the posterior prospective perform-
ance estimate from the computed Bayesian posterior
belief (different from 0), either taking into account the
confidence in the performance estimates or patients’ neg-
lect scores (see section Bayesian Posterior Beliefs above).
All behavioural analyses were conducted in SPSS23
(IBM Corp.) and JASP (JASP Team, 2020). Figures for
behavioural data were generated in R (R Core Team,
2013), using ggplot2.65
Lesion analyses
Voxel-based lesion symptom mapping (VLSM)66 was
used for our main lesion analyses using as predictors (i)
Prior prospective performance estimates, averaged across
hemispaces and (ii) Posterior prospective performance esti-
mates on the contralesional hemispace. Scores were inversed
in order to have higher number corresponding to lower def-
icits. It is to note that these VLSM analyses were explora-
tory by nature, as with the relatively small sample size
(n¼ 26) we have in the present study, we were unlikely to
have enough power for corrected results and hence our
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criteria for multiple comparisons were not very strict (10%
Overlap and using 1% False Discovery Rate correction for
multiple comparisons). We report in the main results only
the significant findings from these exploratory analyses
(regions with Z> 2.363). Full lesion mapping methods
(Supplementary methods 2), an overlay and VSLM analyses
based on clinical AHP scores (Supplementary Results 4,
Supplementary Fig. 4, Supplementary Table 1) are described
in Supplementary materials.
Data availability
The data that support the findings of this study are avail-
able on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/kwrnc/).
Results
Prior prospective performance
estimates in AHP versus HP patients
Before attempting to execute bimanual actions, AHP
patients overestimated their ability to perform bimanual
actions significantly more than HP patients (Z ¼ 3.336,
P< 0.001, p2 ¼ 0.428, see Fig. 2). As expected, the
hemispace where the items were presented had no effect
on patients’ prior prospective estimates (Z ¼ 0.144,
P ¼ 0.885, p2 ¼ 0.001). Moreover, in testing the
interaction between group and hemispace, we observed
that group had no effect on the difference between
ipsilesional and contralesional prior prospective estimates
(Z ¼ 1.369, P ¼ 0.181, p2 ¼ 0.072). Moreover,
we found that the more unaware patients were on our
clinical test of AHP (Feinberg awareness scale), the higher
(unrealistic) baseline prospective performance estimate
they gave on our task [r(23) ¼ 0.590, P ¼ 0.003; see
Supplementary Fig. 3]. Taken together, these results point
to the validity of our experimental set-up to capture
anosognosic beliefs in AHP.
Retrospective estimates in AHP
patients
After attempting to execute bimanual actions, most (al-
though not all), AHP patients were able to recognize that
they had failed to perform the action, and rated their
ability to perform the action (retrospective performance
estimates) as lower than prior to execution [prior per-
formance estimate; F(1,9) ¼ 19.916, P ¼ 0.002, p2 ¼
0.689]. However, this recognition of failure did not sig-
nificantly differ between hemispaces [F(1,9) ¼ 0.330, P ¼
0.580, p2 ¼ 0.035], and no interaction between time of
the estimate and hemispaces was detected [F(1,9) ¼
0.378, P ¼ 0.554, p2 ¼ 0.040]. These results suggest
that on average AHP patients were able to perceive their
failure to perform bimanual tasks on both hemispaces,
despite their initial anosognosic prospective estimates
about their abilities on the same tasks and despite their
neglect (Fig. 3; see Supplementary materials 3, for add-
itional results).
Posterior prospective estimates in
AHP patients
Overall, as expected given their high priors, AHP
patients’ prospective posterior performance estimates were
on average higher than their retrospective performance
estimates [F(1,9) ¼ 8.313, P ¼ 0.018, p2 ¼ 0.480],
with no main effect of hemispace [F(1,9) ¼ 0.197, P ¼
0.668, p2 ¼ 0.021]. Crucially, there was an interaction
in that how much patients’ posterior prospective perform-
ance estimates deviated from their retrospective perform-
ance estimate depending on which hemispace the action
was performed in [F(1,9) ¼ 5.711, P ¼ 0.040, p2 ¼
0.388]. Indeed whereas there was no significant difference
between their retrospective and posterior prospective esti-
mates in the ipsilesional hemispace [t(9) ¼ 1.463, P ¼
0.177], in the contralesional hemispace patients posterior
prospective estimates were significantly higher from their
retrospective estimates [t(10) ¼ 3.870, P ¼ 0.003], sug-
gesting that most AHP patients failed to take into ac-
count their retrospective estimates, especially in the




















Figure 2 Prior prospective performance estimates, in
each hemispace (contralesional 5 left and ipsilesional 5
right). Patients with Anosognosia for Hemiplegia (AHP in red) and
Hemiplegia (HP in blue). Dots represent individual performance
estimates. It is to note that due to the nature of the ‘Performance’
scale (10¼ patients estimate they performed very well the task)
and patients’ deficits (they could not perform the task, their
estimates should be 0¼ not performed at all), the higher the
ratings, the more patients are being over-optimistic on their
performance estimates, and being less aware of their deficit (i.e
more anosognosic).
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Bayesian, precision-weighted
posterior beliefs in AHP
When running one sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests
for each of our two Bayesian Posterior Model Errors (see
Methods) in each hemispace (comparison to a median¼ 0,
no significant error), we found that only the Confidence-
Weighted Bayesian Posterior Model Error in the contrale-
sional hemispace was significantly different from 0
[Ipsilesional Hemispace—Confidence-weighted Model Error:
t(9) ¼ 0.873, P ¼ 0.383, BF10 ¼ 0.335; Neglect-
Weighted Model Error: t(9) ¼ 1.376, P ¼ 0.169, BF10 ¼
0.943; Contralesional Hemispace: – Confidence-weighted
Model Error: t(10) ¼ 2.033, P ¼ 0.042, BF10 ¼ 1.804;
Neglect-Weighted Model Error: t(10) ¼ 0.420, P ¼
0.674, BF10 ¼ 0.461]. This suggests that—in terms of
modelling Bayesian belief-updating—the only model that
fails to explain belief-updating is the model using subjective
confidence as a proxy for aberrant precision when assimi-
lating evidence from the contralesional hemispace (Fig. 5).
Interestingly in the contralesional hemispace, comparing
the model errors obtained with the confidence versus the
neglect scores yielded a significant difference [t(10) ¼
3.274, P¼ 0.008, BF10 ¼ 6.986], suggesting that the
Neglect-Weighted Model is closer to the actual Prospective
Posterior Performance estimate in the contralesional
hemispace. Taken together, these results suggest that while
both subjective confidence and visuospatial neglect affect
belief-updating in AHP, in the contralesional hemispace
this updating is best explained, in terms of Bayesian belief-
updating, when using neglect as a proxy for precision.
Lesion mapping results
Damaged areas related to deficits in prior
prospective performance estimate
The VLSM analysis using the prior prospective perform-
ance estimate as predictor (inversed score) revealed a
large cluster in the supra marginal gyrus area, but also
lesions to the Pallidum, Hippocampus and Amygdala;
and lesions of white matter tracts in portions of the SLF,
Posterior and Superior Corona Radiata, as well as the
posterior limb of the internal capsule (Fig. 6A,
Supplementary Table 2A).
Damaged areas related to deficits in posterior
prospective performance estimates
VLSM analysis using the Posterior Prospective
Performance estimate in the contralesional hemispace as
predictor identified large cluster lesions in Heschl’s gyri
and the Insula but also the Postcentral sulcus and supra
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Prior and retrospective performance estimates in AHP
Figure 3 Retrospective estimates. Prior and retrospective
performance estimates in AHP patients, in each
hemispace (ipsilesional 5 right hemispace vs.
contralesional5left hemispace). Performance estimates
correspond to the estimates AHP patients gave on how well they
think they performed the task, with 0¼ not at all and
10¼ extremely well. Individual data are represented by connected
dots. Please note that each dot can represent several patients, if
several patients gave the same score. From these estimates, we can
observe that overall patients observed their failure to perform the
action, after attempting to do the bimanual action (i.e. retrospective
estimates being closer to the accurate score, 0¼ failure to
perform, than their prior prospective estimate). More precisely: (i)
on the ipsilesional hemispace, only two patients scored higher
retrospectively, however, one had a low prior estimate, suggesting
baseline awareness at the time of testing; (ii) on the contralesional
hemispace, only one patient scored higher retrospectively and two























Retrospective and posterior prospective performance estimates in AHP
Figure 4 Posterior prospective estimates: Retrospective
and posterior prospective performance estimates in AHP
patients, in each hemispace (ipsilesional 5 right vs.
contralesional 5 left). Performance estimates correspond to the
estimates AHP patients gave on how well they think they
performed the task, with 0¼ not at all and 10¼ extremely well.
Individual data are represented by connected dots. Please note that
each dot can represent several patients, if they gave the same score.
From these estimates, we can observe: (i) on the ipsilesional
hemispace, the majority of the patients stay close to their
observation of failure to perform the task (retrospective estimate),
with only 3 patients increasing their estimates (i.e. increasing their
unawareness of their motor deficits); (ii) on the contralesional
hemispace, the majority of the patients increase their performance
estimates, going away from the observation of their failure to
perform the task, and becoming less aware of their motor deficits.
Only 3 patients retained information from their observation (same
estimate for retrospective and posterior prospective estimates),
with two patients recognizing and learning their motor deficit.
Belief-updating in anosognosia for hemiplegia BRAIN COMMUNICATIONS 2021: Page 9 of 14 | 9
Amygdala, Hippocampus, Rolandic operculum and
Superior Temporal areas; and lesions of white matter
tracts in portions of the SLF, superior and posterior cor-
ona radiata (Fig. 6B; Supplementary Table 2B).
Discussion
In the present study, we attempted to address outstanding
questions regarding the inability of patients with AHP to
update their beliefs about their motor abilities, despite
the severe disabilities caused by stroke. We hypothesized
that AHP patients would have greater difficulties in mon-
itoring their errors retrospectively and updating their
beliefs prospectively in the affected than the unaffected
hemispace, where their inattention would render predic-
tion errors imprecise and would thus influence the rela-
tive precision of prior beliefs and sensory prediction
errors.
First at the behavioural level, we found that the retro-
spective performance ratings of most (but not all) patients
with AHP suggested that they were able to recognize that
they had failed to perform the attempted action, despite
their more unrealistic prior beliefs about similar, motor
abilities. This is a well-documented phenomenon in AHP
research called emergent awareness9,10,36,45,54,67,68 and
known to have some beneficial, therapeutic value.69
However, to our knowledge, differences in emergent
awareness between the neglect-affected and non-affected
hemispace has not been previously tested in patients with
AHP. Contrary to our prediction, there were no hemi-
space differences in AHP patients’ retrospective perform-
ance estimates, suggesting that visuospatial neglect did
not influence their sensorimotor monitoring at this level.













Bayesian Posterior Model Errors
(Posterior Prospective Estimate minus Bayesian Posterior)









Figure 5 Bayesian Posterior Model errors. Computed as the
difference between the Posterior Prospective Performance Estimate
AHP patients gave and their Bayesian Posterior; computed either
with their confidence ratings or their neglect scores as uncertainty,
and thus in each hemispace (see section Bayesian Posterior Beliefs in
the Methods section). Dots represent individual data.
A  Prior Prospective Estimates
MNI -11 -2 27 31 35
L R 0 3.5Z-scores
L R
MNI -12 -8 7 19 251 27 31 35
0 3.5Z-scores
B  Posterior Prospective Estimates – in the contralesional hemispace
Figure 6 Damaged areas related to Anosognosia for hemiplegia based on prospective performance estimates. (A) Based on
Prior Prospective Performance Estimates (inversed Prior Prospective Estimates averaged across hemispaces were entered as continuous
predictor). (B) Based on Posterior Prospective Performance Estimates in the contralesional hemispace. Scores were inversed in order to have
higher number corresponding to less deficit.
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correlate with individual, neuropsychological neglect
measures (see Supplementary results 3). It appears that
the reduced attention spontaneously allocated to the con-
tralesional hemispace by patients suffering from neglect
did not prevent them from monitoring their errors when
attention was experimentally drawn to that hemispace. It
should however be noted that this is a partial finding as
visuospatial neglect is a complex, multifactorial deficit
with additional facets such as object-based frames of ref-
erence and different representational levels that were not
assessed in the present study. Moreover, to keep this bed-
side experiment simple for our acute patients, our hemi-
space manipulations were based simply on controlling
where the objects were presented and manipulated in
space, rather than restricting patients’ vision, or tracking
their eye movements. We have however taken individual,
neuropsychological neglect measures in our patients and
we have further used these in our modelling results, as
discussed below.
Most interestingly, we observed that visual hemispace
did have an effect in the degree to which the posterior
prospective estimates of bimanual motor abilities of our
AHP patients differed on average from their retrospective
estimates of motor performance. Specifically, in the con-
tralesional hemispace, patient’s posterior prospective esti-
mates were significantly different from their retrospective
estimates (showing more anosognosia), while there was
no such difference in the ipsilesional hemispace. This
finding suggests that in the contralesional hemispace,
most AHP patients cannot ‘transfer’ their retrospective in-
sight about observed motor failures to prospective beliefs
about motor ability. Instead, these posterior beliefs seem
closer to their unrealistic prior beliefs in the same hemi-
space. These results point towards a counterintuitive yet
crucial finding, namely the visuospatial hemifield in
which errors occur may affect prospective, belief-updating
(Can I put on gloves?), without affecting retrospective,
sensorimotor monitoring (How well did I put on gloves
in this attempt?). In other terms, in the contralesional
hemifield anosognosic patients can acknowledge their per-
formance errors (complete failure due to the HP) to a de-
gree, but they cannot use such observations to update
their more general, prospective beliefs about their motor
abilities. In clinical terms,67 these results suggest that in
the contralesional hemispace, anticipatory awareness (i.e.
prospective performance estimates) is not as influenced by
emergent awareness (i.e. retrospective estimates) to the
same degree as in the ipsilesional hemispace.
Importantly, we found that patients’ posterior perform-
ance estimates in the contralesional hemispace could be
better explained by approximating precision with (object-
ive) contralesional neglect, rather than by their ratings of
subjective confidence. Under the assumption that our
patients were ideal Bayesian observer70—but updating
their beliefs with suboptimal precision—this aberrant pre-
cision is best reflected in objective measures of neglect.
This was expected given that precision in this setting is a
subpersonal estimate of uncertainty or reliability—as
opposed to a declarative or subjective estimate. Subjective
confidence in prior beliefs versus sensory information did
however capture ipsilesional prospective beliefs, and
patients with AHP appeared to have less confidence than
HP patients in retrospective estimates and hence future
studies should explore the contribution of subjective un-
certainty to anosognosia.
Exploratory (given our sample size) lesion analyses
revealed that anosognosic difficulties in belief-updating
were associated with disruptions in tracts of the ventral
attentional network (i.e. SLF connections between tem-
poro-parietal junction and ventral frontal cortex, includ-
ing in this case lesions to the insula, in line with previous
studies).50 Lesions to the SLF were found for both prior
and posterior prospective estimates, thus being involved
in forming, prospective, counterfactual estimates about
one’s motor abilities. Moreover, prior prospective esti-
mates (i.e. learned counterfactual beliefs) were associated
with lesions in the limbic regions (amygdala, hippocam-
pus, pallidum), as previously hypothesized,24,35 while pos-
terior prospective beliefs in the contralesional hemifield
were also associated with lesions in the postcentral sul-
cus, inferior parietal cortex and superior temporal
regions. Interestingly, we have also found associated
lesions to these temporoparietal junction areas, as well as
to the inferior and middle frontal gyri, with allocentric,
mentalization deficits in AHP.13 This would suggest that
anosognosic patients do not correct their unrealistic self-
beliefs as they may be unable to take an allocentric
stance on themselves, i.e. integrate their first-person ex-
perience of the body with third-person views to form a
more ‘objectified’, counterfactual view of the self.24
In the current study, we find that similar lesions, as
well as disconnections of these temporoparietal areas
from their ventral frontal cortex connections via the SLF,
lead also to failures to update counterfactual beliefs be-
yond the ‘here-and-now’ of sensorimotor experience.
Indeed, different social or spatial perspectives were not at
stake in the present experiment but patients were asked
to use their motor, bimanual performance as it occurred
in particular time and hemispace (‘Did you achieve this
task here and now?’) to infer their corresponding motor
abilities in a prospective manner which entails consider-
ation of many possible (counterfactual) times and spaces
(‘How well will you be able to achieve this task at home,
or at work, tomorrow or next week?’). Thus, in this
sense, our findings portray that the aforementioned
lesions and disconnections affect patients’ ability to use
sensory error information from the contralesional hemi-
space to draw more abstract, conclusions about self-
related counterfactuals. While it is known that such ven-
tral lesions may lead to a kind of ‘motivational’ neglect,
or a difficulty to reorient attention in contralesional
hemispace based on salience and behavioural rele-
vance,51,52 the present association of hemispatial neglect
and anosognosic beliefs (rather than just misperceptions)
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is novel. However, this finding is reminiscent of rare
observations made by Mesulam (p. 1329)51 regarding the
relationship between neglect and motivational expecta-
tions; ‘Patients with unilateral neglect devalue the left
side of the world and behave not only as if nothing is ac-
tually happening in the left but also as if nothing of any
importance could be expected to emanate from that side’.
The current study indeed confirms that this observation
applies also at the level of belief formation, so that even
when patients are able to observe what has happened in
the left hemispace (their motor errors), they do not ex-
perience such errors as ‘important enough’ beyond the
given context to update their more abstract beliefs about
their self. Or, as one of our patients said, ‘I know I can
put on gloves by myself, I just could not do it now. If
we were at home, this would be no problem’.
Indeed, we propose that the delusional aspects of ano-
sognosia are best explained as the failure to evaluate
the salience, or relevance of context-dependent sensori-
motor errors (they occur in specific time and space) to
more abstract (context-independent; they can refer to
any time and space) beliefs about the self. Typically,
errors occurring in the neglected hemispace and discon-
nections in the right salience network seem to result in
patients being unable to assimilate the information from
that space appropriately. Ultimately, they fail to inte-
grate their sensorimotor errors from that space with
other beliefs about their counterfactual self. This inter-
pretation is also consistent with prior findings regarding
the disruption and disintegration of several phenomeno-
logical and cognitive aspects of self-processing following
damage to the temporo-parietal region, including self-re-
duplication and out-of-body experiences.71 The exact re-
lationship between the counterfactual belief-updating
impairment we examined in the present study and simi-
lar deficits in ‘allocentric’ mentalisation13 and weak cen-
tral coherence72,73 that have been associated with
similar multimodal integration networks, needs to be
determined in future studies.
We wish to highlight, however, that we do not con-
sider the disconnections and deficits measured in the pre-
sent study to provide a full account for anosognosia,
given the well-documented heterogeneity of the syndrome.
Moreover, our data showed better belief-updating in the
ipsilesional than in the contralesional hemispace but ano-
sognosia and aberrant counterfactual beliefs were present
in both hemifields, as it is long known clinically. Future
studies should test further hemifield manipulations and
could also investigate how different dimensions of neglect
influence unawareness of deficit. Furthermore, on top of
other limitations mentioned above, we wish to highlight
intrinsic limitations of the present study: the limited num-
ber of patients as anosognosia for HP is a relatively rare
phenomenon, the number of trials per condition, and the
effect of lesion’s hemisphere, as we focussed on right
hemisphere stroke patients. Future studies should replicate
and extend the present findings in a bigger sample,
taking into account more interindividual variability, such
as neglect, as well as laterality effects.
In brief, our study suggests that precision-based, belief-
updating deficits may also contribute to the aetiology of
the AHP syndrome, and particularly its delusional fea-
tures that have received less experimental attention than
its sensorimotor features in the past. Our study also has
wider implications for understanding ‘counterfactual’ be-
lief-updating, self-awareness and prospective metacogni-
tion in health, as well as in many other pathologies with
awareness or insight deficits. Finally, future rehabilitation
studies should explore whether feedback about one’s par-
alysis is best offered on the ipsilesional hemispace.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available at Brain
Communications online.
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